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formation given by Ui Hakuju and Guiseppe Tucci. Not long ago I showed 
(Kozfl DaijO-BukkyO, Vol. 9, Shunju-sha, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 12-42) that in 
ascribing the text to a Hlnayinist scholar, Ui, followed by Tucci, failed to 
recognize essential similarities between the text and VV, VP and MK, which at 
least make it possible to attribute it to Nagarjuna or to a Mahayanist close to 
him..
The author’s most problematic assertion is his claim that the Bodhicitta- 
vivarana (BV) is a genuine work of Nagarjuna’s. This text criticizes not just 
idealistic tendencies in general but the entire Yogacara system of idealism at its 
most developed stage, including central theories such as alaya-vijnOna 
(storehouse consciousness), trisvabhQva (three natures), and OJrayaparivrtti 
(transformation of the ground consciousness). The appearance of the 
Yogacara school is regarded almost unanimously as post-Nagarjuna, from the 
fourth century at the earliest. Elsewhere (p. 180, n. 174) the author asserts that 
Nagarjuna was acquainted with the LankavatQrasatra, a scripture that syn­
thesizes Madhyamaka and Yogacara philosophies, and which most scholars 
place in the fourth century. Such statements make one wonder when the 
author places Nagarjuna. I was unable to find any reference to Nagarjuna’s 
dates in the book. If the author thinks that the LankOvatOrasfltra and 
Yogacara idealism preceded Nagarjuna, he should have included the 
arguments to support his contention, for it would seem to contradict the 
generally accepted opinion.
Kajiyama Yuichi
EXISTENTIAL AND ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF TIME IN 
HEIDEGGER AND DOGEN By Steven Heine. Albany, New York: 
State University Press of New York, 1985, pp. ix + 202. ISBN 0- 
88706-000-5
Professor Steven Heine has tackled the ambitious task of advancing Western 
scholarship on DOgen’s philosophy of Zen by introducing DOgen as a dialogue 
partner to Heidegger and so evaluating the success of Heidegger’s 
philosophical endeavour in a “universal setting,” that is, “from the perspec­
tive of comparison with an Eastern thinker” (p. 32). The conventional notion 
of time—as that which flows and is separate from human existence—is for 
DOgen an unenlightened view produced by self-centered deliberation (p. 141); 
for Heidegger it is a derivative view based on the Aristotelian substance on-
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tology (p. 20). Overcoming this objectified view of time amounts to “overcom­
ing substance ontology’* (ousiology). Heine tells us that although DOgen and 
Heidegger agree that “primordial time” is the starting point of philosophical 
reflection and the ground of existential freedom, they differ in their conceptual 
aims, methods and perspectives (p. 9). Heine thus sums up the contrast be­
tween them, saying, “Heidegger’s ultimate concern is ontology, [while] 
DOgen’s concern is primarily soteriological” (p. 10).
For DOgen, the impermanence (mw/O) of existence is the starting point of 
philosophical reflection and the religious quest. The radical temporality of ex­
istence (uji) is the motive for Zen practice. Negating the extra-temporal 
presence of eternal Buddha-nature, DOgen focuses on the “present” (nikori) 
which is the sole locus of resolve (hosshiri), practice (shugyO), enlightenment 
(bodai), and nirvana (nehan), that is, the locus of Zen realization (p. 134). 
Radical temporality (uji) penetrates yesterday, today and tomorrow. This 
mutual and free penetration of the three tenses is the ontological passage of 
temporality (kyOraku), which extends throughout all time (p. 127), thus ex­
plaining DOgen’s conception of time as the “simultaneity of past, present and 
future” (p. 131). In terms of Zen practice, this provides an ontological founda­
tion for the realization of Buddhahood at any time: “Each and every moment 
could be an existential occasion to realize Buddha-nature” (p. 26). Hence, 
“enlightenment is not an attainable goal but a renewable insight and ex­
perience accentuated by diligent practice” (p. 135).
For Heidegger, the inauthentic understanding of time as a sequence of 
static, substantive now-moments shields Dasein (each of us, the person, who 
inquires after Being) from facing its finitude, i.e., its own death, and causes it 
to fall into everydayness, into the dichotomy of “they-self” which is “public­
ly interpreted and expresses itself in idle talk.” Dasein fallen to the status of 
“a thing” present-at-hand (vorhanderi) is no longer an authentic self or 
presence (Anwesenheit). Dasein as vorhanden results from an inauthentic 
understanding of the present as gegenwarten, “making present,” while Da­
sein as Anwesenheit, presence, is none other than the authentic present 
(Augenblick). Only when Dasein recognizes itself as the “ecstatic temporality 
of Being” (Ereignis) (p. 122), that is, only when temporality temporalizes 
itself and gives rise to being, can it attain its freedom from the world of 
vorhanden, objectified existence. Moreover, for Heidegger, “temporality tem­
poralizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been” 
(p. 41). As such, his emphasis is on the “futural” aspect of temporally, as op­
posed to DOgen’s emphasis on the present.
In DOgen’s philosophical stance, the ontological (the clarification of tem­
porality of being), the existential (incessant practice) and the soteriological 
(the quest for enlightenment) are inseparable (cf. pp. 11, 111, 134, 151). In
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Heidegger’s thinking, however, there is an unresolved tension between on­
tology (existenzial) and existence (existenziell), and between theory and prac­
tice. Heine concludes that “Heidegger does not adequately disclose either the 
existential or ontological dimension precisely because the soteriological con­
cern has been excluded from his thinking. ... Heidegger reveals the poverty 
and entanglements of as well as his own bondage to the very tradition of 
substance ontology he attempts to overcome” (p. 149) Heine feels that 
Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy is perhaps more challenging to tradi­
tional Western metaphysics (ibid.).
Heine’s work discloses the beauty, the challenge and the difficulty of com­
parative philosophy and religion. His study, however, does not convincingly 
establish the appropriateness of contrasting the two systems which stand on 
such fundamentally different grounds as philosophy and religion, though by 
juxtaposing the two it delineates the similarities and differences of their com­
mon insight into the “non-substantive view of primordial time” (p. 33). 
Heine’s critical assessment of Heidegger’s achievement, however, is already 
implied in his own organizational framework, which places side by side a 
philosopher who declines to cast his eyes on anything beyond the onto- 
phenomenological and an enlightened Zen master-philosopher whose concern 
transcends the philosophic to the salvific. Heine is certainly aware of this 
disparity between Dogen and Heidegger, and he offers a justification of his 
method by mentioning the fact that Heidegger himself recognized the 
philosophical need for dialogue with East Asia from an original and creative 
perspective (p. 32), and also by pointing to the hermeneutic method and 
philosophical aims of Heidegger, wherein any separation between ontology 
and personal experience “seems to violate the unity of Seinsverstandnis and 
mineness, of (the human] way to be and the potentiality for illumination, 
which is the very ground and framework of his thought” (p. 148).
Heine’s claim that Heidegger’s sensitivity to hermeneutics and language 
would “highlight and deepen an understanding of Ddgen, helping to clarify 
many doctrines and expressions” (pp. 29-30) remains open to question, 
however. His own article, “Temporality of Hermeneutics in DOgen’s 
ShObOgenzb” Philosophy East and West 33, 2 (1983), manages to clarify 
Dogen beautifully without mention of Heidegger. It is ironical in fact that, 
despite his hermeneutical concerns, Heidegger’s own language remains at 
times rather opaque, and its English translations often border on the 
unintelligible. Clarifications of such terms as “ecstatic temporality,” 
“present-at-hand,” “present moment-of-vision,” “the round dance of 
Ereignis,” etc. at their first appearance in the text would have helped the 
reader greatly to follow the discussion. To exercise a “Heideggerian 
hermeneutic sensitivity” is certainly welcome, but to use “Heideggerian
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language” to translate DOgen’s ideas, themselves highly original and difficult, 
seems to obscure rather than to clarify DOgen’s vision. One wonders as to the 
lucidity of such translations as “being-time” for uji and “the totalistic 
passage” for kyOraku. A word on the translation of a passage from DOgen’s 
“Zenki” (p. 110): “Therefore, life lives through me and I am me because of 
life.” This strikes a false note. I would suggest instead: “Therefore, life gives 
me life; it makes my existence a living presence.”
In spite of these reservations, however, it must be clearly stated that Heine 
succeeds in illuminating the core of DOgen’s philosophy of Zen, despite the 
difficulty of DOgen’s thought and the opaqueness of of Heidegger’s language. 
This work demands serious attention from Eastern and Western students of 
comparative philosophy and religion. The reader interested in Dogen studies 
will also find in it many helpful suggestions and a wealth of information, in­
cluding an English translation of the “Up” chapter of ShObOgenzO.
Yusa Michiko
LE SENS DE LA CONVERSION DANS L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE 
SHINRAN. By Dennis Gira. Paris: Editions Maisonncuve et Larose, 
1985, pp. 271. With a list of Japanese texts cited, bibliography, and in­
dex. ISBN 2-7068-0883-7
The publication of Dennis Gira’s scholarly study on Shinran’s thought, Le 
Sens de la Conversion dans L ’Enseignement de Shinran (The Meaning of Con­
version in Shinran’s Teaching), comes as somewhat of a surprise. Recent 
works on Buddhism have been mostly concerned with Abhidharma, early 
Mahayana, or Tibetan Vajrayana. There has been a flood of books on Zen, 
but recently their numbers have been decreasing. On the other hand, there has 
been a slow but steady growth of interest in Pure Land Buddhism, especially 
in the Shin school founded by Shinran (1173-1262). The academic world is 
slowly discovering that the negative attitude toward Pure Land Buddhism 
fostered by such figures as Edward Conze and Christmas Humphreys has 
resulted in an unwarranted bias against this mainstream of Mahayana 
thought. D. T. Suzuki has even called Japanese Pure Land Buddhism 
“Japan’s major religious contribution to the West.”
Gira’s work is the first French publication touching upon Shinran since Fu- 
jishima Ryoon’s Le Bouddhism Japonais: Doctrine et Histoire des douze 
grandes Secies bouddhiques du Japon (1889) which was published almost a
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